The Existence of Mind

Introduction

The concept of Mind -- using that word in the most commonly understood, or dictionary, sense: "That which perceives, thinks, feels, wills, and desires", as an example given by Webster expresses it -- is probably one of the most important in any human endeavour, whether that endeavour be science, technology, the humanities or any sort of spiritual quest: for without Mind, how can any such endeavour be undertaken at all? Indeed, even most physical human activities cannot be conducted without Mind: certainly not the conscious ones.

Thus it seems essential to get a firm grip on the concept of Mind. Among the questions that need to be asked are: What is Mind?, What is primary, Mind or matter?, How many minds are there?, Can artificial minds ever be created?, and others like them.

The Existence of Mind

The very existence of Mind has, at times, been denied or doubted. In such a case, of course, the question begs to be asked: Can anything be denied or doubted at all, without presupposing a mind doing the denying or doubting? Surely even to suppose that a denial can be made or a doubt can arise without presupposing the existence of a mind sounds preposterous. Thus it might be argued that minds -- or at least one mind -- must exist.

But there are more subtle arguments that have at times been employed to show why Mind (speaking in the most general terms) cannot be said to indisputably exist. One of these is the argument that the only entities that can be indisputably said to exist are those whose existence is available to raw experience. If something is directly experienced, such as pain or joy, then obviously that experience is undeniable and indubitable, and thus indisputable. But anything which is merely inferred from that which is experienced might not exist, for inferences might be wrong! Indeed they often are.

Now Mind is not directly experienced: what is experienced are such things as ideas, thoughts, pain, emotions, perceptions, desires, and so on. All of these are presumed to be a result of the activity of the Mind; but that is only a presumption, after all, and there is no guarantee that there must be any such thing as Mind "behind" them or giving rise to them.

Thus it is argued that since Mind is not directly experienced, but merely inferred from the fact that a denial has been made or a doubt expressed, the existence of Mind is not indisputable. And if so, of course Mind might not exist. In such a case, only the denial or the doubt indisputably exists, without there necessarily being any hypothetical "Mind" that lies behind the denying or doubting, giving rise to it.

This is analogous to the way a storm can exist without there being any hypothetical "God of Storms" (such as the Greek Zeus or Vedic Indra) behind the storm, making it happen. If there need not be any "stormer", as it were -- and pardon the neologism -- of a storm, then there need not be any "thinker" of a thought, any "feeler" of a pain, any "doubter" of a doubt. There need be only the thought, the pain, the doubt: just as there need be only the storm.

As of date this argument -- which is quite old, and often found in ancient literature such as that of Zen Buddhism -- seems to be difficult to challenge, in that a counter-argument does not seem to be forthcoming with any ease; and thus it may provisionally be granted that Mind may or may not exist.

And yet a lingering problem remains: for the argument above, being itself not directly experienced but merely inferred, might not be correct! And if it is not correct, then Mind may exist after all. (But note that this counter-argument does not -- yet -- prove that Mind must exist.)

Refutation of the Hypothesis that Mind Does not Exist

However, such a proof can perhaps be obtained in a round-about way. Even though it has to be granted by the above reasoning that Mind may not exist, it must also be granted that it may. Under such circumstances, there are at least two choices: either Mind does not exist or it does. (Is there a third choice? Or more? There don't seem to be any more than two: but then again, it is perhaps best to keep an open … uh, mind! … about that.)

Anyway, even if there are more choices than the above two, one of them is that Mind does not exist. Now if it be assumed that Mind does not exist, and that only direct experiences exist -- and this has been seriously advocated by several highly educated and very intelligent people, among them e-correspondents of the author -- then there seems to a serious question as to whether most of knowledge can exist either. The vast majority of knowledge is not knowledge of things that are directly experienced. For example, knowledge of how to multiply numbers together is not directly experienced: it is learned, sometimes laboriously. Similarly, knowledge of how to travel from, say, New York to Washington is not (necessarily) experienced directly: indeed it is quite possible to have such knowledge without ever having made the journey!

However, any knowledge, once acquired, is directly experienced. There definitely is knowledge, for example, that the writer of the present essay knows how to write, and the reader knows how to read! That knowledge is now a direct experience, although originally it was learned; and thus its existence at present is undeniable and irrefutable.

Thus it seems that the assumption that Mind absolutely does not exist is not in consonance with other kinds of direct experience.

Also -- and perhaps even more to the point -- it must be acknowledged that in order to make the assertion that only direct experiences undeniably exist, and/or that inferences have been known to be mistaken, Mind is required! Such knowledge is not self-evident: it is itself inferred.

Thus it must be acknowledged that any assertion to the effect that Mind (speaking generally) does not exist presupposes the existence of at least one mind, because it presupposes the existence of knowledge which is not directly experienced; and thus such an assertion cannot be true. Or to put it in another way: any knowledge -- or indeed any belief, whether it be true or false -- about whether the Mind either exists or does not exist, presupposes the existence of Mind.

And as a corollary, without such presupposition there cannot be any knowledge; and without any knowledge at all, it cannot be known that Mind does not exist.

Thus it cannot possibly be true to categorically state "Mind does not exist".